THE NATION

JANUARY 14, 1961 . . 25c



THE PILOT'S VIEW OF AIR SAFETY

Karl M. Ruppenthal

KENNEDY'S CABINET

Men in Motion

Ted Lewis

'PUGWASH' ON DISARMAMENT

Unofficial Talks in Moscow

Louis B. Sohn

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LETTERS

He's Pro Anti

Dear Sirs: Sir Stephen King-Hall's splendid article in your December 24 issue on the *Polaris* sub brings this idea to mind: The *Polaris* will be chased by some anti-submarine device, which must in turn be chased by an anti-anti-sub device, which in turn calls for an anti-anti-anti-sub device. So with missiles, which call for anti-missiles, anti-anti-missiles, anti-anti-anti-missiles, etc., the possibilities for letting contracts to keep millions at work are limitless. This takes care of the depressed areas right away.

GEORGE KAUFFMAN

Berkeley, Calif.

The True 'Liberal'

Dear Sirs: Michael Novak's essay ("The Brain Curtain," December 10) is a perceptive but incomplete statement. As I interpret it, the gist of it is that the liberal intellectual has mistakenly divorced himself from common opinion and morality, and has consequently weakened his influence in society. He has been guilty of an unwillingness to communicate his rationale, his aspirations and his personal attitudes. He has failed to accept the undeniable accomplishments of American society.

Mr. Novak has not gone far enough, either in his criticism of the liberal intellectual or in his identification of the problem. I would hazard the following observations:

(1) That the "brain curtain" between the liberal intellectual and the mass of the American people will remain drawn as long as "liberal intellectuals" regard themselves as a privileged element of society;

(2) That there has not only been a lack of self-criticism, but there exists a climate in which only criticism from within will be heard;

(3) That intellectuals generally have identified themselves with liberalism and the Democratic Party, to the point that the future of intellectual freedom in this country may be tied to irrelevant political issues;

(4) That the willingness to accept the risks of free thought and free speech is not widespread among those who call themselves "liberal";

(5) That colleges and universities have failed to demand rigorous standards of discourse and analysis from faculty members, especially in areas of opinion;

(6) That unpopular opinions are no more welcomed by liberal intellectuals than by anyone else;

(7) That many intellectuals regard the idea of commitment to ideals of personal conduct as secondary to the ideal of intellectual brilliance and facility;

(8) That "Madison Avenue" and "public relations" are not so great a threat to American society as is the liberal intellectual's refusal to practice what he preaches;

(9) A willingness to risk freedom by according it to others is more important to the definition of "liberal" than any social or economic philosophy, more important than any comfortable statement of an "unpopular opinion" when one's closest colleagues and friends share the same point of view.

I might add that in the *Merriam-Webster* definition of "liberal," the following qualification appears: "Not bound by authority, orthodox tenets, or established forms in political or religious philosophy; independent in opinion. . . ." If we were to accept this qualification, how many present-day liberals would be in search of a new appellation?

If those who identify themselves as "liberal intellectuals" are not free men—individually, intellectually free men—the mass of the American peope will seek for those who are.

ROBERT L. PAYTON
Director of University Relations
Washington University

St. Louis, Mo.

Policy in Laos

Dear Sirs: While the Cuban crisis and the Congo compete for our attention, the "powder keg" in Laos seems ready for a major explosion. According to a dispatch in *The New York Times*, the official position of Washington was stated in these terms: "And was it (Laos) really worth fighting for? Would it not be better to take a stand elsewhere later? Was the risk of major conflict justified? The United States was saying 'yes,' it was worth it; and 'no,' it would not be better to stand up and be counted later. Its friends were beginning at last to listen, but as yet with only one ear."

Back in the days of Dulles, when the United States tried to get all-out backing from its NATO allies for an all-out operation to hold Indo-China, these same "friends" refused to listen even with one ear. How long it will take them now to get TWO ears operating is anybody's guess. But the problem that should be worrying Americans is — how long, this time, will Washington wait for an O.K. from the NATO allies for "full steam ahead"?

As for the United States policy in Laos — as documented by the U.S. press — if ever there was an occasion when a great power had neither legal nor moral principles on its side, this is it.

HELEN MEARS

New York City

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NEW YORK, SATURDAY, JANUARY 14, 1961
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THE NATION

EDITORIALS

Point of Return

The Castro regime has finally succeeded in its campaign to goad this country into breaking off relations. Whether the Administration was wise in doing so at this time, or on the immediate issue, is beside the point; a break had become unavoidable because Castro was determined to force it. From his point of view, the development has certain obvious short-term advantages: it closes the American Embassy in Havana, seals off the flow of refugees to the mainland, makes possible tighter counter-espionage and sabotage controls, and sets the stage for future negotiations over resumption of relations at which the Guantanamo Naval Base can be used as a bargaining counter.

But the break also offers us an opportunity — given the wisdom and tact to seize it — to return to a new version of the Good Neighbor Policy in Latin American relations. Since the action coincides, roughly, with the return to power of the party which originated the Good Neighbor Policy, it clears the decks for a new approach to Cuban-American relations which, at the moment, are the key to better relations with the rest of the New World. But new policies, however urgent, take time to evolve, especially by an Administration which is just taking over. Without waiting, then, for new policies to be formulated, we should adopt a belated New Year's resolution and swear off further cloak-and-dagger operations in the Caribbean. We have had quite enough of "secret" airstrips which are the subject of international gossip and comment, of artfully staged rehearsals of "invasion armies" practicing in the gardens of Florida estates, of Teddy Roosevelt-style naval maneuvers, of inspired news stories which describe some of the more stupid of Batista's killers as "leaders" of an anti-Castro opposition. And there are other harebrained ventures of which the public knows nothing, or about which the little that is known can neither be confirmed nor clarified. When a top CIA official is quoted as having said of one such venture, "It will be a black day if we are found out" (see editorial, *The Nation*, December 3), and the statement stands undenied, the effect is to give the appearance of confirmation to Castro's wildest charges of planned armed invasion. We may be sure that the Cuban refugees in Florida include many Castro agents and there is more than enough discontent in Central and South America to breed informers for Castro in a volume that CIA cannot hope to match despite its unlimited funds and loose accounting procedures.

As a nation, we are not good at cloak-and-dagger activities, as events in Laos and the U-2 incident should remind us. The fact that we are not adept does us credit as a people. Cloak-and-dagger operations do not comport well with traditional American values or with the national character. Our efforts to play the game have about them all the subtlety of "private eye" television scripts. If it were a question — which fortunately it is not — of using the Marines or CIA as our main reliance in the Caribbean, we would unhesitatingly opt for the Marines. Happily, we have an opportunity, now, to recast American policies in a manner that should make it possible to dispense with both the Marines and the CIA as auxiliaries of the Department of State.

Laotians and Rabbits

In the modern world, if you are a dumb animal you may get some sympathy, but God help you if you are a human being.

The *New York World-Telegram* has discovered that in Harmony, North Carolina, the local American Legion Post celebrates the Yuletide every year with a "revolting frolic," in which about one hundred Legionnaires, men, women, and children, round up and slaughter the rabbit population (which greatly outnumbers them). This would not be news in itself, since the Legionnaires' love for shooting is well known. But in Harmony they don't shoot their rabbits; they beat them to death with clubs, flails, jagged stones and their bare hands. The

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dead rabbits are then frozen and eaten at the Legion's February barbecue. The manner of their dispatching has aroused some unfavorable comment, but a spokesman for the Harmony Post rejects all protests. "We shouldered arms to defend American rights and traditions," he says angrily, "and nobody's going to tell us what we can or can't do." Nobody in Harmony, he adds, is "paying the slightest bit of attention to this rigmarole humane stuff."

A somewhat similar attitude seems to inspire the great powers in the Laotian crisis. The United States is prepared to fight to the last Laotian to the end that the noble right-wing patriot, Prince Boun Oum, and the noble patriot's backer, General Phoumi Nosavan, shall rule the Laotians and keep them safely in the camp of freedom, Western style. On the other hand, the opposing camp of freedom, Soviet style, is airlifting and supplying Laotian soldiers to insure that Prince Souvanna Phouma, at present enjoying a sojourn in Cambodia, shall steer Laos on the strict course of neutrality, with possibly a little more neutrality toward North Vietnam, Communist China and Soviet Russia than toward the capitalists of the West.

No one, however, is much concerned about the three million common Laotians who, like the Harmony rabbits, don't give a damn whether they are neutral or Western, who in fact don't know the difference, but whose all-consuming interest is to survive in peace. The Laotians are so peaceful that even their military men (except perhaps General Phoumi Nosavan) avoid fighting as much as possible. If their allies would only let them alone they would go home, voting, as Lenin said, with their feet. *The Nation* suggests that when the humane societies get through saving the rabbits from the Harmony Legionnaires, they try to do something for the almost equally unhappy Laotians.

Bad Timing for *Time*

In the quotation usually abbreviated to "Life is short, art is long," Hippocrates observed also that truth is difficult to ascertain. It is perhaps even harder to arrive at in our day, when it flows past our eyes and ears in a vast current of print and radio, like the Gulf Stream in an ocean of lies. For any one man to cope with all of it is impossible: we must usually rely, at least in part, on other people's say-so. Thus a long-standing journalistic tradition has established itself — when somebody has said something, and you use it, you attribute it to him. *Time* apparently feels that while this may be obligatory on lesser publications, *Time* alone should be untrammeled. It may attribute, indeed, but in its own fashion. Thus in its January 6 issue, in an item titled "Guatemala — Mystery Strip," *Time* discusses the airstrip and military camp near Guatemala's Pacific coast which has now been discussed elsewhere for some seven weeks as a possible base for a U.S.-Guatemalan-Cuban-exile airborne operation against Castro. "Fortnight ago, poking around the country," *Time* writes in its breezy fashion, "Los Angeles *Mirror* Aviation Editor Don Dwiggins heard about the strip and broke a story reporting that it had been built with U.S. funds in a mysterious 'crash' program and was capable of handling jet fighters." But how and where Don Dwiggins heard about the strip, deponent sayeth not. Don Dwiggins, however, does say. While *Time* was preparing its story, Mr. Dwiggins was preparing one for *The Nation,* which appeared in the issue of January 7 ("Guatemala's Secret Airstrip"), synchronously with the *Time* story. In his story, Mr. Dwiggins refers to his original source, "the report that first appeared in a *Nation* editorial ('Are We Training Cuban Guerrillas?', *The Nation*, Nov. 19)." It is only rarely that *Time* is the victim of such unhappy timing in which, in the same week, the source to which it attributes a story obligingly re-attributes it to its proper source.

The Trespasser

Dr. Earle L. Reynolds is an anthropologist, a former professor at Antioch College, who used to work for the Atomic Energy Commission and, as such, was a member of the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in Hiroshima. In 1951, Dr. Reynolds conducted a study on the effects of radiation in Hiroshima for the National Academy of Sciences. This close contact with radiation havoc apparently affected Dr. Reynolds more than is meet or wise for a good American to be affected by other people's suffering, and when the Atomic Energy Commission declared 390,000 square miles of the Pacific Ocean off-limits in 1958 so that it could conduct uninhibited tests of its nuclear weapons, Dr. Reynolds, accompanied by his wife and children, sailed into the area in a two-masted ketch, *Phoenix of Hiroshima* ("Forbidden Voyage," *The Nation*, November 15, 1958). He was intercepted by a Coast Guard cutter, arrested and flown to Honolulu for trial. Naturally he was convicted, but the judge committed the error of not allowing the defendant to act as his own counsel and the conviction was reversed. Retried, the sailor, home from the Atomic Energy Commission's sea, was again convicted, but on December 29, 1960, the government suffered a second reversal in the U.S. Court of Appeals. "We conclude," the Court ruled, "that when the appellant sailed his ship into the Eniwetok Testing Grounds, he committed no more than a trespass on grounds being used by the Commission."

The Nation hopes that the government will once more proceed against this hardened trespasser who, though equipped with navigational instruments and aware of the fealty he owed to the Atomic Energy Commission in the pursuit of its lawful aims, did sail into

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the waters where these lawful aims were being furthered. We hope that Dr. Reynolds, for his part, has the wherewithal to carry his next conviction up to the United States Supreme Court or, if not, that the money can be raised for him. For it would be stimulating to see how the Supreme Court — well aware as the Court is that this nation of ours in years past has fought valiantly to defend freedom of the seas — would view this lonesome trespass on a vast section of the world's largest ocean marked only by pinpoints on a map. All other trespasses may be forgiven, but this one, never.

Our Subversive Neighbor

For those Americans who are confident that the United States has a monopoly on the good, the true and the politically beautiful, sad news is filtering across our northern border. The Canadians are not cooperating fully in the Great Crusade. They think they can be against communism and yet trade with the enemy, who is infiltrating from both the south and the west. Via the southern approaches have come the bearded agents of Castro, seeking increased trade with the Canadians, who are in roughly the same economic condition as the distressed areas in the United States. Cuban purchases of Canadian goods have been running at a rate of about $15 million annually — nothing to be alarmed about, even for American proponents of the *cordon sanitaire*. Cuban Economics Minister Regino Boti, visiting Canada at the head of a ten-man delegation in December, suggested that the figure be stepped up to $150 million annually. There appears to be more than a touch of Caribbean optimism in this proposal, since the Cubans do not have $150 million in hard currency to spend; nevertheless, Washington began to twitch and tremble and Prime Minister Diefenbaker had to issue soothing statements to calm the shaking colossus. The Cubans did have $3.5 million on hand in cash, so the colossus had something to shake about, although not much.

In Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America there was unconcealed glee. Gerry Robichaud wrote for the *Chicago Daily News* Service that what looked to the Latin Americans like "Canada's twisting of Uncle Sam's beard" was received with widespread admiration and amusement. "You North Americans," said one Latin American, "used to think that we were the only people in this part of the world who were critical of you. Diefenbaker is showing you better. . . . Maybe you'll learn now."

Apparently intent on rubbing salt into the wound, the Canadians received as guests some slant-eyed fiends from Red China. In 1958, Canada exported something over four million bushels of wheat to Communist China without bringing down the edifice of Western unity. This year Canada is again bursting with wheat. The Chinese Reds, despite the unparalleled strides in industry and agriculture which they are always press-agenting, have been deprived of wheat by "natural calamities." The Canadian government would like to export about 300 million bushels of wheat annually. The United States certainly won't buy any of this tonnage, hence the Royal Bank of Canada reserved hotel accommodations in Montreal for the atheistic heathens. There is nothing like having something to sell to make one tolerant.

KENNEDY'S CABINET . . *by Ted Lewis*

Washington

THE KENNEDY Cabinet is generally composed of men on their way up — the comers rather than those who have reached career summits in the past. This is exhilarating in itself. It suggests that men in motion will be operating in tune with a young and energetic President.

Yet it is still fair to say that hosannas in praise of the new Cabinet are premature. On careful analysis, it is no better than most. While it does have intriguing non-political character, in a party sense, it is questionable whether Kennedy will consider it his "team." At some point he well may turn to lower-echelon advisers as confidants and key policy-makers, just as Franklin D. Roosevelt did.

There is some significance in the fact that, with a few exceptions, the ten members of the Kennedy official family are not nationally known figures. Yet below the Cabinet level there are plenty of nationally known names, such as Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, Mennen "Soapy" Williams, John McCloy. These and many others in the same job category are men who basically have already reached the peak of their careers, and it is the view — at least in the industrial segment of our society — that those who have already achieved success and can hope for few further and greater honors are no longer "go-getters" with a consummate drive for more power and greater authority. What may well be more important, they are less inclined to take orders and be team members.

Critics who question the basic difference between those on Kennedy's second team and those on the varsity should scan the Cabinet make-up itself. The Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, is a man on the move upward; so, obviously, is forty-four-

TED LEWIS is a political columnist and acting Washington Bureau Chief for the New York Daily News.

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year-old Robert S. McNamara, Defense Secretary. The Republican Treasury Secretary, Clarence Dillon, has been on the government payroll as an Eisenhower diplomat and high State Department official for seven years, but in subordinate posts. He now has his big chance with an appointment to the top rung. This is also true of Robert F. Kennedy, the President-elect's brother. Others on the way up, seeking to be remembered for accomplishments yet to be recorded, are forty-year-old Stewart Udall, Secretary of the Interior, and James E. Day, the new Postmaster General.

Yes, but what of Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg, what of sixty-two-year-old Luther Hartwell Hodges at the Commerce post, Abraham Ribicoff as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Orville Freeman as Secretary of Agriculture? Well, they all have drive; all have gained their limited reputations in sectional areas or, like Goldberg, within the confines of the labor movement. Each now has the big chance in the nation's Major League.

Even Hodges, despite his age, is a man on the move, with bouncing mental energy, an idea man who first made a fortune in textiles, then went places in politics as Governor of North Carolina. Connecticut's capable Governor Ribicoff was in the thick of Kennedy's Presidential campaign and is definitely a deserving Democrat. But his marked ability transcends his political qualifications. He would be an outstanding choice for any Cabinet. He is also clearly the type looking for new and challenging fields to conquer.

As qualified as these ten men appear to be, and even granting their ambition and drive, the make-up of Kennedy's Cabinet deserves a close examination.

FIRST, there is reason to believe that the President-elect himself may not be wholly satisfied with his Cabinet appointments — that he has had to compromise, to yield to expediency, to choose some of the second best when he wanted to name only the best. The President-elect has great confidence in his deft political artistry; but, once elected, he found his appointment plans were awry. He had hoped to complete his Cabinet by late November. It was nearly Christmas before the last appointment was made (that of California's insurance executive, James E. Day, for Postmaster General). It is perhaps surprising that the Cabinet is as good as it is in view of the frustration that Kennedy experienced in molding it. Historians in the years ahead may find the weeks' travail that Kennedy experienced during this pre-inaugural period full of drama. Historians may see in it the coming of age of the young President-elect, perhaps, or garner from it inklings of the man's human weaknesses — simple, natural weaknesses more likely to increase than to diminish his popularity (as did also those of Lincoln).



Drawing by Berger

Dean Rusk

What do Kennedy's shortcomings during this pre-inaugural period appear to be? He was determined from the very start to find men with whom he could work for the next four years. It seemed that he was looking only for men with whom he could have *rapport* — that subtle feeling which holds together kindred souls. But should that be a criterion for the choice of members of an official family? How many of us have made a choice between job applicants on that basis, and later been disillusioned? Couldn't it also be argued that Kennedy displayed timidity, totally out of character, in pushing aside from Cabinet consideration men who in the past had had the courage to speak out on controversial issues as a matter of principle? Rusk was the choice for State because he had failed to do just that. Kennedy's team of aides, entrusted with the job of sifting the qualifications of prospects, may have been elated to find that Rusk had always been a cautious character.

Yet why should they consider failure to take a stand to be an attribute, considering the tremendous issues of foreign policy that stirred controversy in the last Eisenhower years? Is a cabbage-like refusal to condemn the Eisenhower policies, or even to praise them, to be admired? Yet Rusk has taken no chances. He has never closed in on the Formosa issue, on the U-2 incident, etc.; therefore, according to Kennedy's reasoning, he is a splendid choice for Secretary of State — as free from previous commitments on controversial global issues as Casey Stengel or Frank Sinatra.

THE CHOICE of Douglas Dillon, a Republican, for Secretary of the Treasury was a similarly cautious move, not that of a confident political gamble. Yet Kennedy himself has been a daring political gambler. He has always taken long-shot chances without hesitation. In last year's Presidential primaries, he risked his political career by challenging Hubert Humphrey in Wisconsin, almost the home-ground territory of the Minnesota Senator. Winning there, he gambled on West Virginia, where Catholics are as rare as robins in January. At the Los Angeles Democratic Convention, he cajoled Lyndon Johnson to be his running mate, another dangerous gamble. But now we have caution, almost the kind of caution that is normal for the elderly — not for the young in spirit, the daring "New Frontier" pioneer.

Dillon's choice was undoubtedly a political finesse play that reflected a shrewd, quick mentality. It places a former New York investment banker in Treasury, upsets Republicans who fear that, if all goes well with Dillon's fiscal operations, they will be deprived of the inflation issue against the Democrats in 1962's Con-

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gressional elections and the Presidential election of 1964. With Dillon guarding the Treasury and the soundness of the dollar, and with Kennedy now doing a Tweedledum act about budget-balancing, where are those brave new programs of spending proposed as booster shots to get the nation rolling ahead in a vast economic upsurge?

During the weeks that Kennedy wrestled with the problem of whom he should select for this Cabinet post or that, he often told intimates, with the frankness that is one of his finest qualities, "It is not easy to find the right man for the right job." This is not a new Presidential remark. Ike himself has said it time and again. So have other Presidents before him. But it is a statement that serves to show why the second-best prospect too often has to be chosen for a vital government post.

To save embarrassment to the living, it will be years before the names of those whom Kennedy wanted in his Cabinet, but who declined his invitation, will be known. Robert A. Lovett is only one. He pleaded his uncertain health and his age when offered either Secretary of State or Defense. Lovett recommended Rusk for State and McNamara, of the Ford Motor Company, as Defense Secretary. Kennedy ended up by taking both, but in a manner almost suggesting that he was at his wits' end about these two key appointments. In both instances, he announced his decisions after meeting the two men for the first time, and having only perfunctory chats with both. This procedure was a real variation from the original plans he had in mind. An elaborate system had been arranged for checking the qualifications of all persons that Kennedy and his top aides considered of Cabinet caliber.

This selective system is still being used on the lower levels. The applicant for a job is judged by six standards: his toughness (both mental and physical), his judgment, his integrity, his ability to work with others — and finally his devotion to the principles of the President-elect. In the first go-around, the rating for each of these qualifications is made by the persons recommending the applicant. They also give their answers to such inquiries as to whether the job-seeker has a wide or limited acquaintanceship and if, in his professional group, he is known nationally, or just in his state or home town.

Obviously you don't ask Cabinet prospects themselves, or those who recommend them, to put down on paper this sort of thing, but the application form undoubtedly reflects Kennedy's opinion on the kind of men he wants working under him in Washington, from top to bottom of the job scale.

DESPITE all the difficulties Kennedy had in lining up a Cabinet, to his credit it should be said that the group he finally chose is devoid of political hacks and is marked by a high level of intellectuality. Because the members are men above average mentality, they mirror a very important facet of Kennedy's character. He has absolute trust in his own mental acumen and wants smart folks around him.

Kennedy has short shrift for mentally sluggish politicians or for anyone with a mind that functions like a tired Model T Ford. There is a touch of Ivy League arrogance about this attitude. The late "Mr. Republican," Robert A. Taft, was the same way, although let it be said that loyalty was considered a superlative quality both by Taft in the past and Kennedy in the present. So there will definitely be some dimwits in the incoming Administration—loyal and likable lackeys — but thankfully for the nation Kennedy will see to it that they will not be in vital posts where they could trigger nuclear war or a hair-raising depression.

'PUGWASH' ON DISARMAMENT . . *by Louis B. Sohn*

THE RUSSIANS talk incessantly about disarmament; the Americans are preoccupied with the Soviet threat to the security of the free world. Is there a way to narrow this difference in national approaches to the problems of peace and security?

LOUIS B. SOHN, Professor of Law at Harvard University, took part in the San Francisco Conference which established the United Nations in 1945, and served as a legal officer in the U.N. Secretariat 1950-51. He is the author of Cases on United Nations Law *and co-author, with Grenville Clark, of* World Peace Through World Law.

Though the official channels of communication have dried up since the abortive Summit meeting, the need for informative international discussions has not diminished. With this in mind, a group of Americans, including Leo Szilard, Jerome Wiesner, Walt Rostow and 21 others, went to Moscow to explore these problems with an eminent group of Russian scientists and with scholars from other countries.

The occasion was the Sixth International Conference of Scientists, held in Moscow from November 27 to December 5, 1960. It was one of a series of conferences which started at Pugwash, Nova Scotia, in 1957. The first three were subsidized by Cyrus Eaton, but the later meetings have been assisted by a group of small foundations interested in international scientific cooperation.

The host for the Sixth Conference was the Soviet Academy of Sciences; participating were 75 scientists (including, in addition to natural scientists, also political scientists, lawyers and economists) from 15 countries. In addition to 24 Americans, there were 21 Russians and 8 British participants, 4 from the People's Republic of China, and 2 each from the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. While there was a sprinkling

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of other Europeans and one Canadian, none of the invited scientists from Asia, Africa and Latin America was able to come.

What exactly have we learned from the Moscow Conference? The impressions which follow are purely personal. They are based, however, on the official discussions and on additional private talks with the Russian participants and other prominent Russian scholars.

MY principal impression was that the Russians sincerely and even desperately want peace and that they believe that this goal can be achieved only through "general and complete disarmament." The reasons which led the Russians to this position were not always clearly spelled out, but the principal ones may be summarized as follows:

First, the Russians are still extremely conscious of the losses they suffered in the last war. (All told, more than 15,000,000 men died in the war, not counting women and children. A remark made to me by one of the Russian conferees seems pertinent: "When the war started there were fifteen persons in my immediate family; only four of them survived the war. I cannot understand how people can talk calmly about the possibility of another World War and calculate the probable numbers of victims and survivors. This is inhuman!")

Second, now that the Russians have their own nuclear weapons they seem to understand much better than in the early negotiations in the United Nations the fact that these weapons change entirely the dimensions of future conflicts. No longer can the Soviet Union hope to "win" a war; even a "victory" would turn most of Russia into radioactive rubble. Their traditional defense "in depth," which since Napoleonic times has helped Russia win wars, offers nothing in these days of long-range ballistic missiles. Even the satellite empire, acquired at great cost to serve as a buffer against another attack from the West, will soon be useless. Consequently, the Russians seem to believe that the nuclear revolution in means of warfare requires a complete change in the general attitude toward war and armaments. As one of them put it, in not entirely original phrasing: "Modern war is obsolete; men must be deprived of means of waging it."

In the third place, the Russians are afraid that war will come, even though the two superpowers both want to avoid it. They are willing to concede that despite our "first-strike" posture and the belligerent speeches of some of our public figures, the American leaders are too intelligent to contemplate a nuclear attack on Russia and to invite retaliation which would destroy a large part of the United States. They hope that we will be willing to ascribe the same amount of intelligence to their leaders. But even if fear of intentional war is removed, the Russians emphasize the danger of accidental war resulting from misreading of radar, from pushing the wrong button on a missile-launching site, or from a bomber receiving a wrong coded message when flying near the opponent's territory. There is also the danger of an "escalating war," i.e., a nuclear war growing out of a limited war, and of a "catalytic war" caused by a provocative attack by a third nation camouflaged as coming from one of the two superpowers. The Russians believe, therefore, that if nothing is done to stop the arms race, it is almost certain that a nuclear war will erupt one way or another within the next five to ten years.

This belief is strengthened by their apprehension that in a few years nuclear weapons will spread to several new countries which are not likely to show the same restraint in their use as the United States and the Soviet Union. The odds are too great that in one of these countries a Hitler-like leader will come to power and bring a disaster upon all. An agreement on disarmament must be reached and made enforceable on all the nations before this so-called Nth-country problem becomes serious.

MY SECOND major impression in Moscow was that the Russians are more flexible in their attitude toward disarmament and controls than is generally understood. They not only repeat interminably that they will accept complete controls if disarmament is complete, but they seem willing to accept substantial controls in a first stage if that stage includes a substantial amount of disarmament. On the other hand, they will not accept any meaningful controls if the first stage is limited to "studies" and minor arms-control measures.

Assuming that the United States continues to adhere to the goal of "complete and general disarmament under effective international controls," accepted in several official statements in 1959 and 1960, the discussions in the future need to be focused on two issues: what substantial measures of disarmament are possible in the first stage, and what measures of control are proportional to these disarmament measures? The Russians would like to concentrate in the first stage on a modified version of the French proposal for the abolition of means of delivery of nuclear weapons (missiles, bombers, Polaris-type submarines and long-range guns). They seem to have no objections to including in the first stage other steps, e.g., with respect to conventional weapons and the size of the armed forces, which the Americans might desire. They repeatedly challenged the Americans to produce a scheme for the necessary controls and indicated a willingness to accept them provided that they are actually "proportionate" to the amount of disarmament agreed upon in the first stage. In this connection, they expressed an interest in a new American suggestion for phasing both disarmament and controls on a regional basis. This proposal would involve a preliminary division of each country into a specified number of regions and a disclosure of the amount of armaments contained in each region. While each side would divide its territory the way it seemed best, the other side would be allowed to choose, in each disarmament period, one of the regions to be both disarmed and thoroughly inspected. Special controls would also be instituted to prevent the shifting of armaments from one region to another after a region has been selected. Both sides agreed to study further the implications of this approach.

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Many other problems were also explored in the Conference, including the banning of tests of nuclear weapons and measures for the prevention of an armed attack, as well as such general problems as the role of scientists in the creation of friendly relations between nations. In general, the discussions, though spirited, have shown a growing readiness by the participants to understand each other's point of view. The participants agreed to continue studying all these problems and to hold another conference in the United States in the course of 1961.

TO CONCLUDE: It seems to me that the Russian scientists are sincerely interested in peace and disarmament. It is quite probable that the Soviet leaders are interested in these problems not only for the reasons given above, but also because of their firm belief that in a peaceful world the Communist system will prevail over the capitalist one. Despite their awkward lag in the amenities of life and the difficulties encountered even by top people in getting decent housing and food, the morale of the Russian leaders is high by virtue of their success in the exploration of space. They seem to believe firmly that they will catch up with the Western standard of living in the not-too-distant future. Consequently, they think that they can win many nations to their side by demonstrating that their economic and social system is more efficient and more practicable for underdeveloped countries than American capitalism. Only by war can this "inevitable progress toward socialism" be stopped—and war, therefore, must be avoided.

While some Americans feel strongly that Soviet insistence on disarmament might lead us into a dangerous trap, they seem to assume that in a peaceful world the United States will be outdistanced by the Soviet Union, domestically and internationally. This need not happen, however. If an American truly believes in the future of the American democratic system and the American way of life, if he is confident that in peaceful competition our more flexible economic system will be victorious, if he really wants to assist other nations in their progress toward the American standards of liberty and justice for all, he will not be afraid to accept the Russian challenge. Let us compete with the Russians in things a democracy does best—developing new frontiers for the common good of all, not by pressure and force, but by example and cooperation.

CAN WE WIN the COLD WAR?.. *by Leo Perla*

THE PREVAILING attitude toward the Communist threat has now taken on a new direction in irrationality. Since it is felt that no one can "win" a hot nuclear war, we are now turning our attention to a more "realistic" policy, that of "winning" the cold one.

The illusion implicit in a "position-of-strength" policy is still with us, but there is beginning to be agreement that strength is a composite (as Adlai Stevenson has pointed out) which must include military, economic, political and moral elements. To this idea the Eisenhower Administration has given some verbal support, but has done little to implement it. With the election of Senator Kennedy, however, there seems little doubt but that a real effort will be made to achieve "composite" strength, with special emphasis on the economic element, in a new attempt to win the cold war.

But do most of us really know what we mean when we talk about "winning" the cold war? There is a strong determination to press forward, to "meet the challenge," "to top the Russians" — all in the certainty that by winning the "race" we will somehow by-pass the nuclear stalemate and be rewarded with a new sense of security and power. This is the illusion, and, pursuing it, we haven't even been willing to face up to the obvious reasons why we have been losing the cold war at such frightening speed.

What can we mean when we talk about "winning" the cold war? I suppose we mean that we must overtake Russia militarily and also in our rate of economic growth; our prestige among the uncommitted nations and their loyalty to us must become so great that we need no longer fear the world-wide spread of communism, and we can feel at least relatively secure against any Communist attempt to threaten us directly; we must have the power to change or maintain the *status quo* (outside the Communist bloc, that is) at our discretion, and without fear of Communist opposition. And, of course, to round out our cold-war victory, the Red regimes in Russia and China would eventually crumble under the moral pressures of a predominantly democratic world, or evolve democratically from internal pressures.

A careful look at this picture, however, reveals it to be based largely on illusions. In our more sober moments, we ourselves have practically admitted that the phrase "military superiority" is meaningless, since we know that all-out nuclear war would destroy both sides, no matter which side was "superior." As for the idea of nuclear deterrence, this will continue to be mutually neutralizing (barring some phenomenal military breakthrough) no matter on what level the competition comes to rest.

On the question of economic growth, even if our industry could make more substantial contributions to the military than it is now making, we would be no nearer "winning" the cold war unless we suc-

LEO PERLA is the author of two books on international relations, the recently published Can We End the Cold War? *and* What Is "National Honor"?, *both published by Macmillan.*

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ceeded in making our defense invulnerable and our attack irresistible —an impossibility for the foreseeable future. For an accelerated production of material goods to have any defense meaning in non-Communist countries, we would have to increase foreign aid. But this we could do today without the slightest hardship, if we really wanted to.

We *could* win the battle for men's minds if our national purpose truly reflected the American heritage, and we *could* win the battle for their hearts if we opened our own to their suffering and their aspirations. This *is the only victory which is possible* today, the only "winning" of the cold war which makes sense. We could accelerate our rate of economic growth tenfold, excel Russia in missile weaponry, outer space and every other aspect of technology — and still lose the cold war.

MR. KENNEDY left the American people in no doubt that if elected he would give top priority to increasing the rate of our economic growth. But in what direction? Galbraith, Lippmann and Schlesinger have pointed out the weaknesses of a huge Gross National Product which includes too great a component of luxuries and gadgets; they have stressed the incongruity of an economy characterized by private luxury amid public squalor. Let us assume that Kennedy's program will take account of these pitfalls. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., to attain adequate public services we need only "a marginal shift of resources — say, some $10-12 billion a year more to be employed for public purposes." Well and good; it would be nice to have more public housing, more hospitals, more roads, more recreation facilities, better care for the aged. But what have all these to do with winning the cold war? On reflection, it is clear that the only sector in the public-service area which serves defense directly is education — and this only in science and engineering.

So, viewed in actual figures, the whole furor about economic strength involves a shift of a tiny fraction of our current $500 billion GNP — about one-fiftieth. Of this $10-12 billion shift, only the education component, as I have indicated, can be directly related to defense — a matter, perhaps, of some $2-$3 billion. The envisaged increase in our rate of economic growth would be enough in itself to cover this relatively small added expenditure. We can have adequate public services, retain or even increase the private-luxury sector of our economy, and increase our defense strength with just a little more planning. This hardly stacks up as a contemporary version of "blood, tears, toil and sweat."

"It looks great on you. Why not drop that other junk?"

WHAT COULD be more appealing than the idea that we can "win" the cold war not by consistent and dedicated attachment to the values of our society, but simply by increasing our own prosperity and general well-being? It would seem that the great "austerity" to which the American public will be asked to submit in order to "win" the cold war will not even involve the sacrifice of a single luxury. We can have chromium on our cars and better education, too.

Certainly no reasonable person could object to some improvement in the shameful state of our public services. But I repeat: what has all this to do with the central problem of the cold war? Most people have been made to feel that there is a vital and direct relationship. The truth is that we have lost international prestige not because we have neglected our public services at home, but because we have failed to fashion a foreign policy consistent with our historic political values and objectives. If now again we turn inwards, we are more likely to injure than to help our position abroad, unless our self-concern goes hand in hand with an intensified concern for the needs, aspirations and welfare of the underdeveloped nations.

The continents of Africa and South America are psychologically ready to fall into the Communist orbit, whether or not they actually adopt Marxism. Through the rasping voice of Castro, Latin Americans scream their complaint that we have been more interested in safeguarding our investments than in their grinding poverty. In Africa, as a recent headline over a dispatch from a *New York Times* correspondent put it, "Africa Shouts to America: Choose! — An American visitor finds Africans united in one demand: Support us against your colonial allies — or count yourself out politically in Africa."

It is indeed hard to follow a logic which risks nuclear war to retain possession of Quemoy and Matsu, yet stubbornly refuses to assume infinitely smaller risks — to make the sacrifices and adjustments necessary to safeguard American influence and to protect our reputation in Africa and Asia. In the one case, our firmness makes clear that nuclear war is not too high a price to pay for two tiny pieces of real estate which our Maginot Line concept of defense regards as vital. But we refuse to see any danger to our security in the alienation of two continents. We refuse to stand unequivocally for the principles of democracy we profess because this loyalty might involve a small danger to NATO solidarity. We look with dread at the possibility of a predominantly Communist world, and our whole military and psychological program is directed toward preventing it; yet, figuratively, we use a whip to drive potentially friendly peoples into the Communist orbit. The Communists do not have to take physical possession of South America and Africa to threaten us

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with a peril as great as that posed by the loss of China to the free world. We just have to continue to be indifferent to their welfare, make them hate us a little more.

NO WONDER Khrushchev feels so confident of the future of communism. We are angered by his jovial self-assurance. Why? Because, despite all our proclamations to the contrary, we fear that his confidence is justified, and because he makes us painfully aware of our own lack of confidence and dedication to a consistent national purpose.

The failure of our present policy, with its lopsided emphasis on nuclear deterrents and military alliances, is unmistakable; and unless compassion, understanding and political wisdom begin to direct policy into channels usually called "starry-eyed" and "unrealistic," unless we stop blaming the enmity we have aroused on the Communists and their ingenious propaganda, our world political influence will continue to diminish.

I am well aware that there is great reluctance to admit the basic failure of American policy in the postwar period. This reluctance is motivated by genuine patriotic feeling. But a moment's thought compels the conclusion that a rational patriotism must truly serve the highest national interest, regardless of personal feelings. If, on the basis of national interest, the indictment I have sketched is accepted even by those to whom it does not seem altogether fair, we would be impelled to exert every effort to raise our sights. This could have no other effect but to improve the international atmosphere, and the price we would have to pay would involve primarily no more than a certain emotional discomfort. On the other hand, if we refuse to accept the indictment as valid (it is one, remember, that is leveled against us by much of the world), if we continue stubbornly along the path we have been pursuing, we jeopardize our survival.

It is reassuring to see Senator Kennedy boldly recognizing the failure of our foreign policy to reflect historic American values, notably with respect to the revolutions and shifts of power which are taking place in Asia, Africa and Latin America. "We have allowed the Communists to evict us from our rightful estate at the head of this world-wide revolution," he has said. "We have been made to appear as the defenders of the *status quo*." This is a courageous statement which should hearten every American. But even here we see patriotic rationalization at work. The Communists have "evicted" us and "we have been made to appear as the defenders of the *status quo*." How could we have been *evicted* from a position we stubbornly and persistently refused to assume? How can we say truthfully that it was the Communists, and not events, that have made us "appear" to be defenders of the *status quo?*

FOR ALL practical purposes, we have all but lost the cold war as a direct result of our double standards, the ambiguity of our "national purpose," our betrayal of the basic ideals for which America has always stood. We have tried in vain to wipe out this failure by emphasizing weaponry. We could make no greater mistake than to set out anew with still greater emphasis on nuclear deterrents and military alliances. This way lies not victory in, but intensification of, the cold war— and all that this implies. And even granting an agreement on disarmament, a shift from the arms race to a militant economic one would simply be transplanting a dangerous illusion.

What we need to do is to give consistent, dedicated expression to the historic American political values in our foreign policy. Unless we do this we, no less than the Communists, stand indicted for self-righteousness, for maintaining double standards and moral ambiguities, for holding to a myopic view of national self-interest at the expense of a good part of the rest of the world. This is the area in which we can make giant strides in the direction of true national strength. If Russia attempted to compete, it would only help to clear the international amosphere.

It is dangerous and irrational to entertain any hope that we can "win" the cold war. *We must end it.* We cannot end it on terms favorable to us as long as we continue to turn a deaf ear to cries for freedom overseas and here at home. Once, at Concord, we fired a shot for freedom that was "heard round the world"; today the crash of a shattered window in New Orleans is heard as far, and with quite different effect.

Whatever Happened to Atomic Power?.. *by Ken McKenna*

LESS THAN thirty miles outside Detroit, by the marshy shores of Lake Erie, an awesome complex of pipes, wires, structural steel and odd-shaped buildings stands idle. This is the $88,000,000 Enrico Fermi atomic-power plant, originally erected as a technical showcase for the nuclear-power industry, and scheduled to bring electricity to the Detroit metropolitan area in 1960. But three AFL-CIO unions have filed a court action blocking its completion and threatening to disrupt development of the entire atomic-power industry.

Last June the United States Court of Appeals agreed that the plant might prove a menace to the health and safety not only of its employees, but also to residents of nearby Detroit. It told the Atomic Energy Commission to reconsider the project's construction permit. The AEC has taken the case to the Supreme Court, which is expected to review

KEN McKENNA covers the atomic-energy industry for the New York Herald Tribune.

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it next month. "We submit," the AEC said of the lower court's ruling, "that it is bad science, bad sense and bad law." If the Supreme Court upholds the lower court, the AEC may be forced to review the licenses of other atomic-power plants under construction around the nation.

MEANWHILE, the Enrico Fermi plant, technically able to receive its first elements of atomic fuel, but legally unable to begin electricity production, remains a symbol of Atomic Age frustration. Since 1954, when Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act permitting private companies to "harness the atom," utilities and allied manufacturers have committed $650,000,000 to place seventeen atomic-power plants on drawing boards or into construction. For all the time and millions expended, only three full-scale plants have begun operations, producing relatively minor amounts of electricity. Back in 1955, the AEC promised 2,000,000 atomic kilowatts on the line by 1960; less than 25 per cent is actually being produced.

A casual observer might easily conclude that, as the years pass, the farther away commercial atomic power recedes. Predictions of low-cost atomic electricity for the 1960s are now being stretched to the 1970s. Currently the industry is at a near standstill, with few orders for new plants and only slight technical gains. The high cost of nuclear reactors has made electric companies reluctant to invest their money.

Yet no great public outcry has been raised about the lack of activity. This is all the more strange in that, during the immediate post-World War II years, the subject of nuclear energy had a breathless fascination for public and industry alike. Isotopes and radiation were ready to serve industry, agriculture, biology and medicine. Nuclear power was to be man's new and inexhaustible source of energy. "It is by harnessing the atom for production of power," said John A. McCone, chairman of the AEC, "that the burden of man's labor can best be lifted."

Today, with man-made satellites probing the skies, nuclear electricity, for all its newness, seems old. It has lost its public glamour; cheap electricity in the kitchen just doesn't have the appeal of a man on the moon. Before it ever really came of age, the Age of the Atom gave way to the Age of Space.

But if the public no longer sees romance in the atom, the nation's electric companies are stolidly plugging away at the problem of producing nuclear power at less cost than electricity produced from coal, oil or gas. The problem is purely technological. Basically, a nuclear-power station is not radically different from present steam plants. One turns turbines with heat from the splitting of atoms; the other takes heat from the burning of coal or gas. Hence construction of nuclear-power plants involves not only the normal costs of heavy generating equipment, but the expense of an atomic reactor.

When the government turned the atom over to private industry in 1954, it did not expect investor-owned utilities to build the plants without assistance. The AEC stood ready to share costs. Under a program to encourage utilities to invest, the first plant went into construction at Shippingport, Pa., that year. The AEC paid the bulk of the reactor costs and Duquesne Light Co. financed the conventional generating equipment. Within a year of the law's enactment, forty-one utilities proposed four large power projects. Significantly, two of them were to be financed entirely by the sponsoring companies; the other two firms accepted only a minimal amount of government aid. In all, $277,000,000 in private capital was invested to produce plants that would, in five years, turn out 579,000 atomic kilowatts — about enough to light the city of Milwaukee. None of the utilities involved had any illusions that the investment would net cheap atomic electricity.

Why were so many utilities, despite their innate conservatism, willing to make these tremendous outlays? To put it simply, they were afraid that if they didn't spend, the federal government would.

Private utilities, of course, are forbidden by law to engage in direct competition for customers. Their only rival is electricity manufactured with government backing, and the success of the Tennessee Valley Authority demonstrated how potent this rivalry can be. Ten years ago, investor-owned companies represented about 80 per cent of the nation's total electrical capacity; government-owned stations produced the rest. By the end of 1959, the private companies' share had dwindled to 76 per cent, a loss of 7,000,000 customers.

But the industry's fear of an atomic TVA has lessened in recent years. Simultaneously, it has apparently come to feel that a little apathy right now, considering what it has already invested, is altogether in order. Besides, there is no overwhelming, immediate need for a new energy source. The cost of coal and other standard fuel is still cheap by comparison; the supplies remain adequate.

CERTAINLY, a reversal of the Enrico Fermi plant decision would have a salutary effect on the investing attitude of the industry. The case illustrates many of the problems responsible for the present torpid state of atomic-power development.

In 1955, twenty-one private companies created the Power Reactor Development Co. to build and operate a 100,000-kilowatt reactor named for the late Nobel Laureate. The reactor was to manufacture steam which would be sold to the Detroit Edison Co. for the production of electricity. Even in an industry whose prime activity is experiment, the Detroit plant was viewed as daring, since it was designed to use a "fast breeder" reactor that produces more nuclear fuel than it uses (the fuel is plutonium, used for weapons).

Less than a month after the AEC issued a construction permit for the plant in 1956, three AFL-CIO unions demanded its withdrawal on the grounds that safety qualifications had not been met. The court, in deciding against the AEC, questioned the legality of building a nuclear plant near a dense population center and ruled that the AEC had not made certain that the reactor would be safe. The court held that, under the Atomic Energy Act, "Congress intended no reactor should, without compelling reason, be located where

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it will expose so large a population to the possibility of a nuclear disaster." For the AEC and the industry, the notion that a nuclear plant could not be located near a large city without "compelling reason" had dismaying implications. Consolidated Edison, for instance, is erecting a 175,000-kilowatt station within twenty-four miles of New York City. If atomic stations must be restricted to remote areas, the Enrico Fermi advocates contend, they would have to be built in deserts or tropical islands where no one could use the electricity anyway. The builders of the plant gloomily commented that the decision "casts



a cloud over both construction permits and operating licenses already issued to numerous other reactors located in areas of comparable or greater population density." The AEC agreed. "This is a case of major national importance," it asserted; the outcome could "seriously impede and, in significant areas, might even block the programs and policies that the AEC has carefully developed."

The unions, on the other hand, argued that the court's ruling applied only to the Enrico Fermi case, implying that the power industry was trying to win the suit by literally making a federal case out of it.

The second part of the decision (it caused more annoyance than alarm) held that the AEC must make a definitive evaluation of a plant's protective measures against potential radiation before issuing a construction permit. (The commission's practice has been to make a preliminary safety check prior to issuing a construction permit and then to complete its findings only after a unit was ready for operation.) If the new ruling were extended to other plants, the AEC would be forced to stamp a final judgment on a project, involving a little-known technology, years before it was finished. Designs for atomic plants are under constant modification during the three-to-five years' construction period, and to evaluate all its safety factors at the outset is impossible.

Conscious of the heavy investments involved, the AEC has come to realize that private companies must have assurances a plant will be licensed when operational. It is no longer impressed by blueprints for large atomic stations employing an untried technology. It prefers that builders first cut costs by experimenting with a reactor concept, then build a small prototype and, when all development and safety questions are answered, erect the full-scale plant. Such a procedure would have averted the Enrico Fermi difficulties. Seven New York State utilities recently took this lead when they announced a $10 million research project in preparation for the ultimate construction of a $100 million plant.

EVERY consideration of nuclear-power development ends in economics. More and more companies — utilities and electrical manufacturers alike — have become disillusioned with nuclear power because of its expense. For instance, the 145,000-kilowatt Yankee Atomic Plant at Rowe, Mass., went into operation this year with plans for producing electricity at 12 to 14 mills per kilowatt versus the 9 mills for standard plants in the area.

Concern for safety has been a major reason for the cost of atomic power. The industry cannot afford to take a chance on radiation accidents or an uncontrolled nuclear reaction. One manufacturer ascribes a third of reactor expenses to safety devices, many of which are alleged to be unnecessary. Most of the $350,000,000 program at the AEC National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho is devoted to combatting safety costs. [Ironically, it was at this station that an explosion last week killed three soldiers.—Ed.]

The safety problem manifests itself most pointedly in the public attitude toward the atom. The Enrico Fermi case sharpened public fears. Last September, a Congressman from a district in which an atomic plant was planned commented favorably on the court's decision: "I seriously question," he said, "whether the AEC's method of handling these license cases is in the best public interest. It seems to me that the AEC is needlessly gambling with either the public's safety or the public's money, and this shouldn't be."

General Electric and Consolidated Edison recently made independent surveys of the public's views on atomic energy and came up with similar conclusions — the public must understand atomic energy before it will accept it. "Ignorance and confusion go hand in hand with fears and doubts of the peacetime role of the atom," the G.E. study noted. Even though 84 per cent of the persons questioned believed that nuclear-energy development is important to the world-wide prestige of the United States, the figures showed that 32 per cent were not sure the atom should be used to produce electricity, and 6 per cent were certain that it should not be.

THIS year the privately owned companies that make up the troubled nuclear-power industry face additional worries, including a new Administration. Many Democrats, after all, are proponents of government-controlled power who argue that there is no room in the industry for the profit motive. Kennedy has called for "aggressive atomic research and development." He went on to declare that the atomic program "has fallen far short of expectations. There has been too much bureaucratic red tape and too little budget — too much time between the drawing board and the production line and too little spent on looking ahead with vision."

Campaign rhetoric notwithstanding, many industry observers doubt that the new Administration will change things very much. After all, the Democrats controlled Congress for the last six years; and, through the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, they exercised direct supervision over the AEC. Congressmen who fought bitterly for government aid

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to build large plants made no headway with their colleagues. Their defeats can be explained purely in monetary terms. AEC operating expenses reach the astronomical amount of $2.5 billion annually. Appropriations above this level are hard to come by.

Moreover, on the Kennedy agenda the atom will be just one item among many requiring sizable expenditures. In the end, Mr. Kennedy will most likely decide that since the public doesn't seem to care much about atomic power, he would do better to spend money in other directions.

A few things are certain. Mr. Kennedy will name a new AEC chairman and fill an existing vacancy on the commission. A revamping of the commission to end its divided responsibility is likely. Under the present arrangement, the AEC administers and regulates the atomic industry and, at the same time, promotes its development. These responsibilities are often in conflict.

Another thorny problem facing the new Administration is the Atoms-for-Peace program initiated seven years ago to "bring the benefits of atomic energy to the peoples of the world." Robert McKinney, former U.S. representative on the International Atomic Energy Agency, recently made a study of the program and found it to be lagging. His principal conclusion was that atomic power is too expensive to be practical in view of the fact that most of the world's industrial areas are still well supplied with conventional fuels at reasonable prices. He criticized the AEC for concentrating on the development of "hardware" that was more impressive than technologically advanced. He concluded that commercial atomic power on a completely economic basis is still a long way off.

Certainly, the state of technology in the United States has shown little to export. But atomic power, like the Atoms-for-Peace program, cannot be dismissed as obsolete. It is a scientific wonder child of which the public expected too much too soon. A re-evaluation of causes for its growing pains could help bring on a swifter maturity.

THE PILOT'S VIEW of AIR SAFETY .. *Karl M. Ruppenthal*

HOW QUICKLY we allow disaster to slip from memory! The Brooklyn-Staten Island air crash of December 16, with its death toll of 135, commanded headlines from coast to coast as the greatest air tragedy in our history. Yet, but for the misfortune that one of the planes plunged into a Brooklyn street, killing some bystanders, this crash can be accounted as no more tragic than one that took place more than four years earlier, in the summer of 1956.

Coming together on converging courses, two planes collided over the Grand Canyon of the Colorado, killing 128 passengers and crew members. Both pilots were on course, operating precisely according to the rules, when the crash came. The trouble was that the rules were outdated; the old "see and be seen" concept was already anachronistic, and federal aviation officials had not seen fit to replace it. Nor had they kept equipment up to date. This busy Western airway lacked sufficient radio facilities.

KARL M. RUPPENTHAL, veteran air-line pilot and author of many articles on air transportation, lectures on transportation and management at Stanford University.

For years, air-line pilots had been demanding improvements in the creaking airways machinery. Now, after the Grand Canyon crash, Congress belatedly took action. At that time, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) made the safety regulations, and the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) was responsible for enforcing them. When accidents occurred, the CAB was charged with investigating them — and here was the hitch. For the CAB, which made the rules, was not likely to blame the rules when an air crash occurred. Accident reports were frequently hedged so that they did little to point up the real causes.

In an effort to correct this situation, Congress dissolved the CAA and set up the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), giving it unprecedented powers to establish and maintain safety and traffic rules. The CAB was left with the responsibility for investigating accidents.

From the beginning, the Air Line Pilots Association, organization of the commercial air-line pilots, favored many of the changes made by Congress, and there is no doubt that in its relatively brief history the FAA has accomplished many constructive things. Perhaps its greatest accomplishment was in allocating airspace as between military and civilian aircraft. Yet, even before the FAA was many months old, there were indications that the new body was vulnerable in certain areas of its operations. Several courageous Congressmen took note of the danger signals and proposed to take action.

THE Brooklyn-Staten Island disaster makes action all the more urgent. The difficult and necessarily slow investigation of this tragedy will probably culminate in Congressional hearings which will undertake to review the adequacy of FAA regulations. Here are some areas that merit close investigation.

1. Why does the FAA have no valid statistics indicating the hazard of mid-air collision? For years its predecessor agency, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, attempted to keep accurate records in this regard. These reports were obtained through the wholehearted cooperation of the pilots who, after all, have more to gain from safe operations than any other group in the world.

Conscientious employees of the old CAA and all the air-line pilots knew the value of careful reporting. Each near-accident was analyzed to

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determine what might be done to prevent a recurrence. Sometimes antiquated regulations were changed. Sometimes airways were moved, better training practices were instituted, or new safety devices were requested. Carefully compiled near-miss reports are vital if we are to minimize the danger of mid-air collisions. They are like a thermometer that points to a fever.

The reports were made possible through the cooperation of the CAA controllers, the Air Line Pilots Association and the individual pilots. This cooperative effort came about because of the CAA's philosophy that the important thing was safety.

TODAY THE FAA statistics would indicate that the near-miss problem has all but vanished. But the airline pilots would violently disagree. Not six months ago, the former chief pilot for one of the major air lines, now regularly flying on the jets, stated unequivocally that the hazard of mid-air collision was never greater. Over a score of qualified pilots were present at that particular gathering. Not one of them disagreed. Equally significant, neither did any of the company's officials present.

The simple fact is that today scarcely anyone connected with commercial aviation will report a near-miss to the FAA. Instead of accepting a near-miss report as a symptom of a dangerous condition, the agency too often regards it as reason for taking action against the parties involved. There have been instances in which individuals have been disciplined for conditions beyond their control: a pilot has been suspended or a controller dismissed when what was really needed was an improvement in training procedures, a reduction of work load, or an improvement in facilities. And, of course, few pilots or controllers want to report a dangerous situation if the only result will be to get a colleague in trouble.

2. Do the FAA's noise-abatement regulations encourage pilots to compromise safety? Ever since the airplane was invented, pilots have been conscious of noise; for years, many of them have participated in voluntary programs to do everything reasonable to reduce it on landing and take-offs. But it has always been well understood that nothing should be done which would compromise safety.

But of late much of the emphasis has changed, due largely, perhaps, to heavy community pressures. In an effort to placate the complainers, the FAA has issued regulations which encourage pilots to follow certan anti-noise traffic patterns even when it might be safer to do otherwise. True, the regulations state that the pilot may still take the safer course of action, but the burden of proof rests on him. If the FAA later rules that he was not justified, he may face suspension of his license.

3. Why are most airports still improperly lighted? In recent years amazing advances have been made in radio facilities. Today the Instrument Landing System makes it possible for a pilot to approach an airport when the ceiling is as low as 200 feet and the visibility restricted to half a mile. But even when he is just off the end of the runway, he sometimes cannot see the airport — particularly at night and in conditions of marginal visibility. Fifteen years ago, the Air Line Pilots Association, the Air Transport Association and other groups began a study to determine the very best airport lighting systems. They came up with recommendations which have since been adopted as standards for the world. Yet here in this country we still have a hodgepodge of lighting systems, some good, most of them inadequate. The FAA has announced that it is going to study the problem anew. It is the feeling of pilots that too much time has been lost already.

4. Why are there still no standardized requirements for copilot training? For years, the Air Line Pilots Association has urged this. While it is true that most air lines now give their copilots adequate training, there are no adequate regulations by which the more short-sighted must abide. Some time ago, the FAA drafted a regulation which would have required copilots to have type-ratings on the planes on which they serve, thus demonstrating that they were fully qualified to take over in the event anything happened to the captain. But after noting protests from a certain segment of the industry, the FAA dutifully watered down the regulation. Today it states merely that all training programs must meet with the approval of the FAA. This is an extremely poor substitute for the original proposal. It opens the door to the possibility of favoritism in the enforcement of none-too-clear training standards. Some air lines may be put to unnecessary expense trying to please a finicky FAA inspector; others, by various means, may be able to skimp where better training should be required. In any case, the regulation fails to provide the public with assurance that all copilots are properly qualified.

Second officers, too, should be properly trained. Today every jetliner has three pilots in its operating crew. Today's complex jet operations require the full-time attention of two pilots; the third is necessary as a reserve. Here again some air lines have spent thousands of dollars properly training their men. But others attempt to save a few dollars. And in a narrow sense, perhaps they are justified in so doing. For the FAA has not yet recognized the necessity for the third pilot to be properly trained. Regulations state that the captain must be in good physical condition, but they do not take into account the fact that even pilots are subject to heart attacks, sinus trouble or an unpredictable stomach upset.

WHILE the points discussed above do not include all the critical areas that merit attention by Congressional probers of the Brooklyn-Staten Island crash, they are among the more important. On these, and others, there is an abundance of data, much of it provided by C. N. Sayen, President of the Air Line Pilots Association, in evidence before a Senate subcommittee. A year ago, Senators Monroney and Engle and Congressman John Bell Williams proposed that corrective action be taken. Let us hope that it will not require still another catastrophe to bring about that action.

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BOOKS and the ARTS

The Logic of No Return

ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR. By Herman Kahn. Princeton University Press. 651 pp. $10.

George G. Kirstein

NO AMERICAN wants war. There is absolutely no division on that question. Moreover, Americans are almost unanimous — the opposition amounts to no more than 2 or 3 per cent—on the methods by which war is to be avoided. The theory is that we must stay as strong as, or stronger than, our potential enemy. Furthermore, we must make it clear that if our enemy goes beyond what we believe are tolerable limits, we are prepared to use our devastating weapons to stop him. There is every reason to believe that the Russians are also unanimous in their desire for peace, and that they subscribe to the same belief in strength as the method for avoiding war. The mere fact that, throughout the whole of history, men have always held to this belief, and that it has never yet preserved the peace, apparently discourages neither side.

Herman Kahn is a semi-official spokesman for the prevailing orthodoxy. For the past twelve years he has devoted his time as a staff member of the RAND Corporation, which is the Air Force's thought factory, to studying the relationship between weapons and strategy. But while Mr. Kahn shares the common desire for peace and believes thoroughly in the theory of deterring the enemy by strength, he is not as hopeful as most of his countrymen that war will be avoided. Indeed, Mr. Kahn believes that there is every likelihood of another war—a thermonuclear war—and he faces the prospect with fortitude. This book, a compilation of lectures, is about that war.

It is concerned only indirectly with the issues which might cause the war, and makes little effort to define "victory" or "defeat" in such a conflict. The subject matter is the war itself: how it might be fought, what preparations should be made to fight it, what strategy we or the enemy might adopt in waging it. Whether or not this book will frighten the Russian "decision makers" who will unquestionably read it, I do not know, but it can hardly fail to frighten American readers.

Mr. Kahn has little patience with the "idealists" who believe that the next war will result in world annihilation. Indeed he believes that they are directly responsible for the failure to develop a necessary shelter program: ". . . these idealists can scoff at attempts to reduce casualties from, say, 100 million to 50 million Americans, reflecting that the situation is hopeless anyway and that the only Respectable Cause is the total elimination of War."

The author is prepared to stake his reputation on the proposition that a thermonuclear war will destroy neither of the warring nations. Under the worst circumstances, he envisages 160 million American dead and calculates that the economy would require a mere 100 years to recover its current productivity as measured by Gross National Product. A war that killed 20 million Americans would cause only a ten-year interruption to our progress and with 40 million deaths we should need twenty years to regain our present economic levels.

Arguing from these hopeful assumptions, Mr. Kahn urges in the strongest terms at least a minimal shelter program. He believes that $500 million spread over a few years would greatly decrease the destructive effects of a thermonuclear war. One item which should be stockpiled, indeed it stands at the head of his list, is radiation meters for the use of the survivors. Mr. Kahn allocates $100 million to this purchase. He feels that survivors might be so frightened or discouraged after a thermonuclear attack that they would not attempt to rebuild the society and economy, unless they were reassured as to the wholesomeness of the atmosphere. For example, someone might begin vomiting as he emerged to view the landscape after a thermonuclear attack. If he had no radiation meter handy, he would not know whether he had eaten some food which might have disagreed with him, or been made needlessly squeamish by the sight of his incinerated fellows, or whether he was exhibiting the primary symptoms of an overdose of radiation.

The bulk of the book is devoted to considering alternate strategies for conducting thermonuclear war. Obviously these strategies would vary depending on the availability of weapon systems as they are developed in the years ahead. Therefore, Mr. Kahn thoughtfully contemplates a variety of wars—World War VIII, for example, would occur in 1973—in order to illustrate the differing and increasingly sophisticated methods of annihilation. It is not that the author anticipates more than one World War III; he uses the numbering system merely to differentiate between the kind of war that might be fought in 1973 with, say, World War VI, which would be fought in 1965. By World War VIII it is expected that both sides will have manufactured an abundance of missiles—say 20,000 each for ourselves and the Russians and 10,000 for all of the neutrals. He feels that under these circumstances, we might be "unacceptably vulnerable to surprise attack." As he points out, ". . . the thought of having 50,000 alert missiles is a bit frightening. This is particularly true since many of them may be in the hands of 'less responsible' powers than we." Mr. Kahn is to be commended for the restraint with which he expresses himself—"a bit frightening" is a notable example of dignified understatement.

THE AUTHOR feels, and this reviewer agrees, that discussion of thermonuclear war should be as widespread as possible in this country. He believes that, as a prerequisite of such discussion, we must "create a vocabulary that is both small enough and simple enough to be learned, precise enough to communicate and large enough so that all important ideas that are contending can be comfortably and easily described." (In an essay entitled "Non-Survivability Plus," written for *The Nation* of March 5, 1960, I made what I hope may prove to be a contribution to this project by entitling the new language "Desperanto.") Here, then, is a partial list of terms which Mr. Kahn defines at length: clandestine cache, preattack mobilization base, minimum deterrence, finite deterrence, counterforce as insurance, credible first strike capability, doomsday machines, homicide pact, controlled reprisal, bonus damage, catalytic war, limited counterforce, postattack coercion, postattack environment, calculated win, disguised warfare, postattack blackmail, mutual homicide, automatic overkill. Unfortunately, the book has no index: the interested student of Desperanto must search the text assiduously.

The author encourages debate on his concepts of strategy, but he warns that these debates will have little value unless the participants are at least as sophisticated (presumably have as firm

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a grasp of Desperanto) as present policy planners, including Mr. Kahn. He feels that the ultimately dangerous debaters are those "men of good will," usually intellectuals, who believe that you can just sit down with the Russians and come to agreements. Men who believe that may exist outside the author's imagination, but I have not met them. I have met and share the opinions of those who believe that bargaining, compromise, and the gradual elimination of points of conflict and the sources of mutual terror are far more promising methods than the ones which occupy Mr. Kahn's mental processes, as augmented by the computers available to him at the RAND Corporation. For the position Mr. Kahn takes, it seems to me, is the ultimately unsophisticated one.

He warns in his text that it is imperative for the researcher in this field to ask the "right question." Yet he never asks the basic question as to why we should be concerned with preserving a species of animal which can weigh coolly the concepts set forth in this book. If *On Thermonuclear War* were concerned with the destruction of 100 million or more dogs, anti-vivisection societies, sportsmen and dog lovers generally would raise a howl of protest which would deafen even the "decision makers." But because the subject matter is the incineration, poisoning and starving of women, children, and perhaps a few combatants, this book has been hailed as the important work of a thoughtful and dedicated man, and recommended for reading by the country's leaders from the President down. That it deserves wide reading, I agree, for it is the ultimate example of the fruits of the support which our officialdom is extending to its chosen scholars. If survival is to be bought at Mr. Kahn's price, the question must arise, is it worth it? To Mr. Kahn it is, to me it is not.

No one knows how many of Mr. Kahn's predictions as to the strategy which we or our opponents will adopt in the forthcoming thermonuclear war will be borne out by experience. The author devotes one entire chapter to guessing whether the survivors of thermonuclear attack will envy the dead, and of course concludes that it will still be thought good to be alive. Perhaps the majority of readers will take heart from this book's thesis that the next war will not be as devastating as the "idealists" would have us believe. It had the reverse effect on me. I can understand and respect career military officers who have chosen the "honorable profession of arms" as a way of life, often at a sacrifice in comfort and emoluments, and who are subsequently assigned the duty of formulating war plans to meet all eventualities. But Mr. Kahn is a physicist, a scholar and a civilian. To be blunt, his book made me ashamed that we are fellow countrymen.

The Belated Discovery

THE OPENING OF THE FIELD. By Robert Duncan. Grove Press. 96 pp. $1.45 paper.

Kenneth Rexroth

ROBERT DUNCAN has published some ten or more books. This is the first to appear under the imprint of a national publisher, or at least a New York one. Since he was a boy, editing *Experimental Review* with Sanders Russell and *Phoenix* with James Cooney, he has enjoyed a considerable reputation amongst readers and writers of what is still unfortunately termed the *avant-garde*. From San Francisco and from Black Mountain College, his personal influence on young writers has spread far and wide. Today he ranks with Denise Levertov, Robert Creeley, Charles Olson, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Allen Ginsberg, as one of the leaders of the New Poetry—so recently discovered by the media. He has never received a major fellowship or prize, nobody has ever offered him a teaching job in a smart girls' school, if he has ever been published in a quarterly, I missed it. In fact, until the last couple of years, the literary Establishment in America pretended that he didn't exist. In further fact, whenever I used to mention him in an article, the name would always be corrected to some other Duncan, a minor member of the Establishment, of whom I had never heard. Since Duncan has been a mature writer with a fully developed style for a long time, this lonely grandeur is an odd state of affairs. To understand it requires a short lesson in literary history.

All during the twentieth century American poetry has alternately expressed two antagonistic tendencies. One

KENNETH REXROTH, a frequent Nation *contributor, is the author of* Bird in the Bush *(New Directions).*

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has been the *consensus orbis terrarum* of poetry in our time—a world idiom that the newspapers still call "modernist." Although this idiom was first worked out in France, in the decay of Symbolism and the reaction against it, the difference of time is slight. The development took place all over the world in the same years—from Blok to Mayakofsky, from Ruben Darío to Neruda, it was in the final analysis the same process, a reorganization of the sensibility and accompanying it, a new syntax.

From 1912 to 1929, this was the dominant tendency in American poetry, too. It was disrupted by the depression and the pseudo-proletarianism of the thirties and finally gave way to a counter tendency. At its best this latter was a return to the traditions of English verse, especially that of the Baroque period. By and large, however, it was simply a conservative reaction, a return to academic stereotypes that could be taught, "seven types of ambiguity" and the politics of the far Right—T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound and the Southern agrarians. Mostly it was just a teacher placement bureau and a fellowship hunting club.

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Its prime article of faith was, "The age of experiment and revolt is over." Most of its members denied, quite sincerely, that poets like Duncan did or could exist. In fact, it was not until one of Lionel Trilling's students got in trouble for writing a dirty poem and made the picture weeklies, that any of them dreamed that anyone could be a writer any more who was not at least a teaching assistant.

IN actual fact, the Reactionary Generation came totally bankrupt out of World War II, its power gone, despised by its students. Since its members held control of many channels of publication, fate took a little while to catch up with them. In the last couple of years, a movement that had come to fruition in the years immediately after the war is at last gaining public notice.

Of the postwar poets—this new generation of experiment and revolt—Robert Duncan is one of the most accomplished, one of the most influential and, it can be said of this and his last three books, *Caesar's Gate, Letter-Poems, Selected Poems,* probably the most mature. Some of his colleagues are narrow, some are warped, some make a virtue of their immaturity, a couple are frivolous or desperately "immoral." There is nothing of this in Duncan. He is a grown man.

It's a little awesome, reading these poems. They have a noble gravity about them that we don't expect from our contemporaries; they have a deep sonority and a steady pace, like the plain-song processional, "Media Vitae." It is not solemnity of subject, although many have that too, but a kind of inner life attitude of immense seriousness and devotion. At the same time, the poems have a strangely uncontemporary worldliness, as though they had been written by one of those dignified and accomplished literary men about town of the Victorian era—Monckton-Milnes or Walter Bagehot. It's not just dignity; perhaps it's wisdom. Wisdom is a virtue, like courage and magnaninity, that we have long since lost the habit of expecting from literary people, so it's hard to recognize it when it appears.

The previous generation of experiment and revolt had tended to treat the work of art as a construct rather than a communication. Duncan comes to poetry seeking the communication of an organic wisdom, as in the act of love. This is poetry which transcends the existentialist dilemma, a gift of the self to the other. Hence its religious, or specifically its reverent, tone, because it does, in poetic act, what the philosophers of personalism and communion discuss. It is responsible, as only the work of art can be and, alas, so seldom is.

The Era of Villard

OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD, LIBERAL OF THE 1920's. By D. Joy Humes. Syracuse University Press. 276 pp. $4.50.

Freda Kirchwey

DR. HUMES'S STUDY of Oswald Garrison Villard in the twenties is a discerning and useful summary of a decade whose features have become badly blurred in a relatively short time. Viewed from the distance of today it has a deceptive look of unblemished reaction. There were Harding and Teapot Dome; the demoralization that accompanied the business boom and the shock of its collapse; there was isolationism, unattractively coupled with a burgeoning imperialism. But alongside these dismal aspects of the period were many energetic impulses of protest that were well expressed by Mr. Villard and the causes he led or supported. Even a reader who lived through those years is likely to be jolted into surprised recollection by Dr. Humes's skillful reconstruction of old battle scenes: the fight to restore liberties crushed out by the wartime sedition acts and by postwar repressions; the proliferation of farmer, labor and other minority political movements which reached their high point in the 1924 Presidential campaign of Robert M. La Follette; the long effort, ultimately successful, to get the Marines out of Haiti, Santo Domingo and Nicaragua. These and many more Dr. Humes describes with a nice mixture of detachment and sympathy.

She deals with Mr. Villard himself in much the same manner. Her book is a friendly report rather than a critical analysis, yet it manages to be objective. Dr. Humes stresses the "righteous indignation" that animated Villard's approach to every sort of social or political skulduggery and his tendency to ascribe moral deficiencies to those with

FREDA KIRCHWEY, former editor and publisher of The Nation, *is now at work on a book about this weekly between 1918-1955, to be published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston.*

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whom he disagreed. At the same time, she does full justice to his undoubted courage and his real flair for effective and lively journalism. You get the picture of a zealous reformer using his long experience as a newspaper man and his intimate contact with the world of affairs to accomplish a difficult combined operation: to fight what he liked to call "the good fight" and in the process to build his weekly into a crusading journal of high quality.

NATURALLY *The Nation*, as a major adjunct to its editor's public activities, has an important role in Dr. Humes's story. She draws heavily upon it for documentation of Mr. Villard's stand on the issues with which he was concerned and for data on the events of the period itself. Brought into focus in this way, *The Nation* of the twenties surely looks wiser and more prescient than it did to its own editors and contributors during those years. But even discounting this natural effect, one can believe that Mr. Villard's *Nation* had a substantial influence on the movement of opinion that resulted in the "peaceful revolution" of the thirties.

A minor weakness in this study, I feel, is its failure to recognize the inconsistencies that marked its subject's career and views. The fact is that Mr. Villard veered from a position of *laissez-faire* liberalism to one of accepting almost any degree of state interference that seemed to him necessary for the protection of the public welfare. Perhaps correctly, Dr. Humes attributes this capacity for change to the pragmatism dominant in American thought as a whole. But what she does not quite perceive is the degree to which Villard's pragmatic flexibility did violence to principles he had strongly held. It represented, not a rethinking of his basic philosophy, but rather a series of concessions to his naturally humane impulses. Inevitably, what emerged from the change was a position essentially fragile—for all the eloquence and energy with which he defended it.

This was demonstrated by its later collapse under the impact of the New Deal. Liberalism-come-to-power seemed to Mr. Villard a new form of statism, which meant tyranny. Miss Humes recognizes the rise of this attitude in her last chapter, in which she reflects on the retreat of many former liberals to the shelter of the "new conservatism." Yet she firmly declares that "the pragmatist and rationalist Oswald Garrison Villard could never have understood and accepted" this point of view—gliding over the fact that his disenchantment with the Roosevelt brand of liberalism had, even before World War II, landed him in the camp of the ex-liberals whom she evidently has in mind.

But one can question Dr. Humes's reading of Mr. Villard's final position on the political chart without detracting from her studiously accurate record of his course through the twenties. Taken as a whole, this is a most valuable account of a man and a period. It will be drawn upon by other writers, including this one, for a long time to come.

AMERICAN BOOKS in VIENNA

Helmut Bonheim

ON CHILLY days in Vienna, students find it pleasant to keep warm in the Amerika-Haus Library (USIS) in the center of town, just opposite the Opera on the Ring. But the collection of books and periodicals, extensive though it may be, showed some peculiar blind spots when I last tried to make use of it.

For seven copies of *Life* I found one of *The Atlantic*, about as high-brow a publication as could be found there. *The Reader's Digest*, available in both English and German from several newsstands in Vienna, was in good supply, but of the more liberal magazines there was hardly a trace. I wonder what it would do for American prestige to display a few issues of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* or of the *Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of America*. At least these would not be thought objectionable on political grounds, as other better-known periodicals might be. America is rich in a variety of low-circulation, high-brow periodicals which literate Austrians admire, as literate people do elsewhere; but we don't put this good foot forward. The British Council, by

HELMUT BONHEIM is the author of The King Lear Perplex *and has just completed a study of James Joyce's fiction, to be published later this year. Mr. Bonheim edits a new little magazine,* MICA, *and is on the English faculty of the University of California, Santa Barbara.*

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contrast, manages to stuff a most impressive rack in its reading room with such periodicals; the idea is to show what is available in England, not what is most read.

The Austrian may think of culture primarily as an accumulation of past achievements, but he also respects our tendency to view culture as the current rate at which we add new achievements to the old. And popular magazines are not likely to do justice to that rate, except at the level of kitchen appliances and gadgets. Nor do popular magazines very much exploit the opportunity of a free press to criticize its government or challenge official policy. Such criticism is an advantage of the American Way much advertised abroad, but a governmental agency devoted largely to propaganda naturally finds it a little embarrassing to distribute examples.

According to an official of USIS, the library spends money on *Better Homes and Gardens* rather than on literary and scholarly periodicals because it believes that the wider-circulation magazines give a more accurate and representative picture of America, and that Austrians of the average level we are trying to reach are more interested in our latest refrigerators and washing-machines than in our new writing and art and scholarship.

Now it is true that the average Austrian reads movie magazines as does the average American, but the influential and educated Austrian would not cite them as representative of his country. Yet many who read English fluently have never heard of *The Nation*, *The Hudson Review*, or *The Progressive*, which, like the university quarterlies, might come as a pleasant surprise to him — unexpected creatures from the land of Mammon. At present we run the risk of presenting as typical of our culture that which foreign intellectuals most fear and despise in their own. An Austrian teacher told me that even the best of American literature was mere journalism, a view not altogether unwarranted when one considered the Dreiser-Steinbeck sort of works with which he was familiar. Perhaps his view helps explain why USIS-sponsored seminars for Austrian teachers of English are not infrequently hampered by a fear on the part of those attending that they might pick up an American accent.

A PREVAILING anti-intellectualism in America may obscure the fact that the average Austrian is willing to respect achievements he does not personally enjoy. A nation of less than eight million people, and one of the poorer in Europe at that, willingly supports a magnificent opera house, one of the finest art museums in the world, and an educational system which sends its best products to work in richer countries like Germany and the United States. Yet it has been asserted that of the thousands of people who watched the bombed opera house burn in 1945, many weeping at the sight, most had probably never attended a performance there. Men of that orientation may never tire of admiring our fancy home freezers and washer-dryer combinations, but they will respect in a different way artistic and literary productions of more lasting value.

Perhaps this failure to show what we have typifies our failure to suit our activities to local mores and values. We give what the mass market of our country values, not what others may value. We subsidize tidbits of a side of our culture that many Austrians view with extreme dislike, such as the showing of third-rate Hollywood movies (because they are "typical") and the translation of fourth-rate American fiction (because it shows the "American scene"). I do not mean that the American taxpayer should balk at these expenditures as wastes of money — precious little is spent on these activities. But the balance of taste is too often established by American standards in Washington, not Austrian standards in Vienna. Similarly, our exchange students tend to represent prevailing American notions of the scholarship-worthy young person most likely to profit from a year abroad: a sunny personality, non-academic big-man-on-campus, an extra-curricular whiz.

One of my first encounters with the Amerika-Haus library occurred when I tried to draw on its considerable resources to prepare a lecture on modern American verse. The poets generally considered most important by our own valuation were scarcely represented, and even the anthologies available seemed to favor the easy sort of verse we feed to junior high school students. T. S. Eliot's name was apparently relinquished to his adopted England, and Ezra Pound was not to be found in the catalogue. Subsequently I learned that the library had undergone considerable weeding-out during the McCarthy era. The resulting collection, safe and unobjectionable, could hardly be called a monument to the freedom which is our boast and the basis for our claim to leadership.

Poem for a Painter Who Drinks Wine

If you could shape in stone the thing you seek
Through interchangeable tongues through labyrinth
Of faces breasts as similar as stars as unattainable
As white what distant place you look to without name
What lonely height
You flee by planet hurricane by moon
From one man's restless bed outwitting him to intercept
His hands and mouth at rest in tender hair shout
Outraged elegy and chant and fable of anemone
Not finding him asleep in any woman's cycle or outgoing tide's
Alone the tireless self barefooted runs from stair to stair
Crying aloud
not there
not there
not there

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THEATRE

Harold Clurman

DO RE MI by Garson Kanin, Betty Comden, Adolph Green and Jule Styne (St. James) is a dandy show; in most respects the best musical of the season. (And think of it, the show was done for a mere $350,000!)

Musical comedy is the theatre form in which we Americans excel. Yet if I were challenged to say which of the musicals in recent years was a masterpiece, in the sense that *The Mikado, La Belle Hélène, The Threepenny Opera* are masterpieces, I should be hard put to speak with complete assurance.

The reason for uncertainty is that so few of our musicals are altogether of a piece — possessing an artistic identity that may be said to represent a way of thinking, feeling or seeing—emblematic of an individual, a social mode, or an epoch. Our musicals are only generically significant, giving evidence of energy, good nature, intellectual passivity, cleverness and the talent or resourcefulness of particular individuals among our comedians, choreographers, composers, etc. Musical comedies—especially in the past ten years—are successful corporate efforts—generally a trifle synthetic—rather than genuinely expressive works. They are entertainment machines resembling the great national weeklies: triumphs of efficient journalistic organization with a personality that is so to speak more "subliminal" than specific.

Do Re Mi, to use a professional phrase I overheard in the lobby during intermission, is admirably cemented. But when I try to define its essence, I grow doubtful that there is any. The story tells of a ne'er-do-well with ambitions of dazzling success: money in the bank, mink for the wife, name in the newspapers and the best spot on the floor of night clubs. His wife begs him to get an honest job, but he feels that to do so would be an admission of failure. His is the Broadway dream: splash! He goes into the juke box business with the aid of some old-time buddies, semi-reformed racketeers. He discovers a sensational new singer, gets involved in his partners' shenanigans—they can't abide competition—runs afoul of a government investigation, proves himself a flop as a slick heel, and finally realizes that his wife was right and that if he does his duty as a simple sober citizen and takes time once in a while to dance with her, all will be much better.

A moral tale then, a sentimental plea for modest, lower middle-class, supposedly unspoiled human values. It is all made very amusing until Phil Silvers, as Mr. Jerk Everyman (my name for the character), has to deliver the philosophy of the show in grandiloquent recitative à la Ethel Merman in *Gypsy*. The audience is half-touched and half-embarrassed by the mixture of good will and phoniness. It applauds nevertheless because it feels that it ought to approve the homily—though it does not live by it—and more especially because Phil Silvers, a grand performer (and up to that moment very funny) is likable in every respect.

In sum, the "book" is a mere excuse or framework—and thoroughly serviceable as such—to enable all the contributing forces to do their stuff. In addition to Silvers there is the fantastically down-to-earth clowning of Nancy Walker. Her rendition of the song "Adventure"—in which she uses a blanket and a dressing gown to express the "mad extravagance" of her life with a no account and unaccountable husband—is close to genius and the high point of the evening.

There is, very strikingly, the zany ebullience of the Betty Comden and Adolph Green lyrics, so heightened by the innocent frolic of a headlong impetuousness that they can never seem anything but charming whatever their detail. There is also the unusually good baritone of John Reardon—he must beware of forcing it—and the intriguing range of Nancy Dussault's voice. (This is a season of fine voices in our musicals: for example, that of another young baritone, Ron Husmann. His singing and Eileen Rodgers' good looks are the only things I remember from *Tenderloin.*) There is excellent casting among the minor parts; and Garson Kanin handles the production as a whole in a way to reveal his friendly kinship with the giddy world the show depicts.

Another feature that is not only superior but extraordinary is Boris Aronson's sets. They make original and varied use, witty and shrewd, of the idiom of modern art—from Kandinsky and Klee to Calder—for entertainment purposes. These sophisticated sets do not obtrude as a "specialty act," but satirically mirror the fabulous vulgarity, the epically electric mishmash of our midtown environment. In them the gaudy decorative patterns of the juke boxes become the stained glass insignia of Broadway religion.

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MUSIC

Lester Trimble

AS IF to rebut my recent argument against the overuse of Americana in the lyric theatre, the NBC Opera Company came along on New Year's Day with the televised world première of *Deseret*, a successful three-act opera based on a fictional episode in the life of Brigham Young. Despite a few reservations about the music (and more concerning the text), I thought the work a high-quality product. The music was conservative, but it was fresh, real and communicative. It was never vulgar or slick. Occasionally it marked time for a portion of a scene, and in these spots, the entire proceeding went dead. But even then, I felt that the composer's creative impulse was honest and respectable. He played no tricks; threw in no tinsel. His inspiration may have failed, but his taste had not.

The degree of achievement displayed by *Deseret* does not, of course, refute the point that Americana, as an idea in itself, has been badly overworked. It proves that a lucky prospector may still find a nugget in an almost-exhausted vein of ore. It also points up the familiar fact that, aside from music, the protean elements in opera are character and the interaction of characters — not locale or period. *Deseret* is a morality play founded on a special, coherent set of social and religious principles. The fact that it was laid in the American West, in a theocratic empire founded by Brigham Young (which later became the State of Utah), was relatively unimportant. This story was a kind of tribal fable which could have taken place in any locale where the Christian concept of love and that of *noblesse oblige* were not alien. It did not have to strum the "folksy" harp. There was no need for the phony dialects which have grown so tiresome in Americana pieces. There was no emphasis on local color for its own sake.

I don't know how many wives the Mormon leader, Brigham Young, may have had. But he didn't have twenty-five. *Deseret* is a fictional story about the twenty-fifth who never was; about Brigham Young's choice of the youthful Ann Louisa Brice; her acceptance of him and her subsequent surprised love for Captain James Dee, who had been sent by Lincoln to borrow money from Deseret; her rejection of Dee for duty's sake; the kindness and wisdom of Young in releasing her from her vows and permitting her to leave Deseret.

It is an efficient scenario: conventional, but solid. Anne Howard Bailey, the librettist, gave herself three major characters with whom to work (Ann Louisa Brice; Brigham Young; Captain Dee); one secondary character (Brigham's first wife); and two "ensemble" characters (Ann's parents). A small cast containing all the necessary elements.

Unfortunately, Miss Bailey's skill in outlining the scenario did not always carry over into the composition of lines. There is a great deal of specious rhyming in the text, some outright doggerel, and a few ideas which, to say the least, stretch credulity. For example, in a passage from one of Ann's first-act solos, describing Brigham Young's mansion and his wealth: ". . . They say that he sends from sea to sea/For foods and spices strange and rare/ A thousand candles burn each night/And nobody counts the cost or care./ They say that this house has a hundred rooms/ Yes, a hundred rooms all in rich decor/ *And a private school with a swimming pool.* . . ." (!) There is also a conversation of the heroine with herself, a conceit which has become almost a trademark in American libretti since Gian Carlo Menotti made Monica sing to herself in *The Medium*. We hear: ". . . What is your name?/Mrs. Young—Mrs. Brigham Young!/Where do you live? / Lion House! I live in Lion House! . . ." And, as she moves about the room, gesturing to make-believe guests: "Come in . . . Come in . . . Come into the parlor, it's the finest room you ever will see. The draperies are Belgian lace, the carpet feels like eiderdown. Here's the sofa . . . please sit down./ The velvet's soft as on a gown. . . ." In *The Medium* this device had a rather touching effect, since Toby (to whom Monica was really singing) was a mute, and they both were children. The tinge of infantalism, therefore, was appropriate. Used indiscriminately, however, the device is coy and tiresome, and I wish librettists would lay it aside.

Since Leonard Kastle, the composer of *Deseret*, is a former student of Gian Carlo Menotti, and a very young man (31), it was probably inevitable that some influence of the teacher should show up in his first full-length opera. It was surprising, though, that the influence should have been on the libretto, rather than, particularly, on the music. His style is not audaciously individual, but neither is it derivative. There are many harmonic felicities within its conservative framework, and a nicely judged amount of contrapuntal involvement. Kastle also has a good sense of dramatic timing, so that passages of action without singing were well backgrounded and spun out by the orchestra.

The capacities of television being limited in terms of sound, this particular element — the orchestra — was somewhat subdued. The voices consistently held predominance. These were all first-rate. Judith Raskin, Mac Morgan, Marjorie McClung, Rosemary Kuhlmann, Kenneth Smith and John Alexander did the best job of looking good while sounding good that I have ever witnessed. The direction by Kirk Browning was smooth as silk. Jan Scott's sets were extremely handsome and convincing, and so was the musical direction of Peter Herman Adler.

The Wind Walks Like Water

The wind walks like water through my fields . . .
it hums like girls and stands erect as rain.
It yearns not, but moves softly driven
through the slender motions of the grain,
in the bowing of the leaves,
in the stirring scarcity of hair
(mock me gently, boy I was) . . .
in a man who's old enough
to know the passing of those things
that can't be seen.

JACK MATTHEWS

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Crossword Puzzle No. 898

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

1 Any one of direct composition might be a written commendation. (6,2,6)
9 Stuffed on top of something? (7)
10 See Cuba for an inadequate answer, if just this. (7)
11 A changing season can make a sound resemblance of it. (9)
12 It takes twice as much to make a note whole. (5)
13 Demean oneself. (7)
15 Split in an inferior manner? (7)
16 The result of a small point being introduced. (7)
18 One who eats too much (when those who drink too much are around) could at least supply the water! (7)
20 Worked at making the round trip? (5)
21 Job location. (9)
23 Made by the declarers? (7)
24 Does pie represent a single 21 in play, perhaps? (7)
25 Does one swear off spirits entirely, when one does? (4,2,3,5)

DOWN:

1 Is such a sort of prop morally bad, though not particularly shady? (8,6)
2 Supports bundles of hay. (7)
3 This should have been a pleasant understanding! (7,8)
4 Ancient but not entirely Old English. (5)
5 These should appropriately go up Telegraph Hill! (5,4)
6 No longer writing of what a religious banner might be doing? (15)
7 Placed in one of Keats' subjects? (7)
8 This could not be involved in the first sentence. (14)
14 Makes a straight line of dandies. (7,2)
17 A bad spell of rain needs something which goes around a Japanese city. (7)
19 South American flower? (7)
22 They shouldn't have to be filled too soon after cutting. (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 897

ACROSS: 1 Scrambled eggs; 9 Upper; 10 Armadillo; 11 Charges; 12 Seismal; 13 Mains; 14 Stevenson; 16 Tightrope; 18 Irons; 19 Replace; 21 Astatic; 22 Adoration; 24 Entanglements. DOWN: 1 Source material; 2 and 23 Repeating rifle; 3 Mirages; 4 Leads; 5 Damascene; 6 Godlike; 7 Salem; 8 Howling success; 14 Slovenian; 15 Sports fan; 17 Teacart; 18 Interim; 20 Probe; 21 Annul.

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

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

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